DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO:J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical DirectorFROM:Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site RepresentativesDATE:6 January 2006SUBJECT:Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Training: In November 2005, NNSA completed a series of readiness assessments (RAs) to verify implementation of transportation related controls, which were a subset of the controls implemented as part of the Technical Safety Requirements Integrated Implementation Plan (TSRIIP) and a deliverable to Board Recommendation 98-2, Safety Management at the Pantex Plant. The final RA identified training weaknesses that are indicative of a programmatic breakdown in the process that implements training required in the safety basis. Subsequently, PXSO directed BWXT to perform an assessment of its training process for safety basis controls. This week, BWXT issued a report that documents an assessment the quality assurance division performed to validate the training developed and disseminated for 32 randomly selected TSRIIP controls (the total TSRIIP population consists of 163 controls). The assessment concluded that the training documentation reviewed provides reasonable assurance that personnel requiring safety basis controls training have received the required training. But the report also identified a number of weaknesses and potential improvements within the training department. For example, the report identified that the process to assure that the appropriate people have been trained on the proper controls relies almost exclusively on expert-based knowledge. The review team also noted that the process for canceling training courses is informal and that several courses that appeared to be "safety related" were designated as "not safety related".

Readiness Assessments: In memoranda dated 24 May 2005 and 7 July 2005, PXSO expressed concerns to BWXT that recent readiness assessments and readiness verifications had identified an excessive number of findings and that BWXT should perform a root cause analysis and identify potential corrective actions. BWXT performed the causal analysis that identified a need for improved project team training and qualification, as well as a need for the manufacturing organization to ensure that the flow down of authorization basis requirements is adequate. On 17 October, BWXT issued a standing order that established requirements for responsible managers to complete an affidavit certifying that facility startup/restart requirements have been met prior to commencement of the readiness reviews. The readiness department has also reviewed and improved the training for readiness assessment team members, in addition to creating a database of past readiness assessments findings, grouped by functional area, for tracking and trending purposes.

Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety (CDNS) Review: NNSA personnel representing the CDNS conducted a review of PXSO in November 2005 and issued a final report later that month. The review concluded that PXSO's oversight and assessment processes are generally effective. The review also identified 22 findings and 24 weaknesses, primarily in the following functional areas: training and qualification, nuclear materials management, operations, quality assurance, safety basis, and startup and restart of nuclear facilities. The Site Office Manager has directed PXSO Assistant Managers to create action plans and/or evidence of closure packages to address each finding and weakness.

Emergency Management: The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) conducted an inspection of the Emergency Management Program at Pantex during July and August 2005. The inspection team identified six findings in the following areas: hazardous chemical screening and assessment, processes for communicating with off-site authorities during an emergency, training and qualification of emergency response personnel, and lessons-learned mechanisms. BWXT has performed root cause analyses and identified and documented corrective actions to address each of the OA findings.